The Debate about Spain’s Past and the Crisis of Academic Legitimacy: The Case of Santos Juliá

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Som la ferida mai tancada,
som la història que no han escrit.
—Obrint Pas, “Som”

¿A quién le importa eso de la memoria histórica?
Pregunten a uno de 18 qué es eso de la República o Franco”
—Mariano Rajoy, 26 March 2007

A nation has first to have remembered something before it can begin to forget it.
—Tony Judt

According to Santos Juliá, Spain’s leading intellectual historian, the venerable Spanish tradition of the national essay—in which, for more than a century, prominent intellectuals from Left and Right regularly analyzed and lamented the sorry state of their fatherland, diagnosed the ailments of the collective national body and psyche, and prescribed radical cures that would allow Spain to fulfill its true, glorious destiny—did not survive the country’s transition to democracy. “Cuando se habla el lenguaje de democracia”, he writes in the concluding section to Historias de las dos Españas, his massive intellectual history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Spain that appeared in 2004,

resulta, más que embarazoso, ridículo remontarse a los orígenes eternos de la nación, a la grandeza del pasado, a las guerras contra invasores y traidores; carece de sentido hablar de unidad de cultura, de identidades propias, de esencias católicas; los relatos de decadencia, muerte y resurrección, las disquisiciones sobre España como problema o España sin problema se convierten en curiosidades de tiempos pasados (462).
This welcome demise of the national essay tradition, Juliá suggests, is largely due to the disintegration of its two sustaining pillars. The first of these is the notion of the “two Spains”, which for a century and a half dominated and organized Spanish intellectual life, shaping the competing “grand narratives” of Spanish national history. The second is the phenomenon of the oracular type of public intellectual. These intellectuals, endowed with “autoridad casi sagrada”, never failed to participate in “los debates públicos sobre cuestiones de interés general”, liked to address the nation as prophets announcing disasters, as priests showing their people the road to salvation, as politically committed writers championing the cause of a mute collective subject, or as moralists who, from a position of ethical purity, criticized all those in power (Juliá, “Intelectuales” 1–2). In post-Franco Spain, Juliá explained in a speech held at the 2005 award ceremony for Premios Ortega y Gasset, this type of intellectuals no longer exists—and that’s a good thing, too.

Juliá’s analysis resembles that of Russell Jacoby, who argued in 1987 that the United States had suffered an “eclipse of public intellectuals” as progressive writers and thinkers of younger generations had become “publicly invisible” (5–6). But while Jacoby lamented the disappearance from the American public sphere of thinkers interested in addressing “a general and educated audience” (5), Juliá celebrates the absence of the ambitious, generalist intellectual. As is well known, Jacoby attributed American intellectuals’ dwindling public presence to their massive entry into the university system, which encouraged them to write for a more limited audience of fellow academics, in a more specialized language and on narrower subjects. Juliá maintains, by contrast, that intellectuals have not ceased to write in the press for a general readership. In fact, he states, any newspaper reader in Madrid, Paris, Rome, London or New York “encontrará sus páginas más pobladas de intelectuales que nunca”: “Sobre cualquier tema posible, de la guerra de Irak a la manipulación genética, del terrorismo islamista a la sedación paliativa, [...] cientos, miles de intelectuales dejan oír cada día su voz desde las páginas de sus periódicos” (“Intelectuales” 3). The crucial difference with the intellectual of the previous generation—“universalista, omnisciente, depositario del sentido de la historia” (3)—lies for Juliá in the new intellectuals’ scaled-down pretensions and in the way their opinions are being received. Today’s reading public—more educated and more skeptical—is unlikely to grant intellectuals’ voices any more credence than those of others. The intellectuals, for their part, no longer claim to be oracles who know everything about everything: if they write in the papers or appear on television, they do so as specialists in a well-defined area of knowledge. As a result, Juliá concludes, intellectuals no longer function as “estrella polar” in the national public sphere, but much more modestly as “observadores críticos”, who have substituted “la crítica radical” with “la crítica reformista”
The new intellectual works from within the system (*dentro del sistema*), only speaks on subjects in which he possesses “competencias específicas”, and is fully aware that “la convicción se disuelve en puro moralismo cuando no puede ser realizada responsablemente” (3). Today’s public intellectual, in short, is a modest, sensible, and reformist expert.

Surprisingly Juliá, unlike Jacoby, hardly talks about the institutional, social, and material dimensions of the changes he describes; nor does he really address crucial issues of authority, legitimacy, and prestige. The institutional dimension is important, however, because in practice many of Juliá’s modest experts, like Jacoby’s new American intellectuals, are academics. Moreover, it is in part their academic position that provides them with the authority, legitimacy and prestige needed to function in the public sphere.1 In fact, one cannot help suspecting that Juliá, when talking about the new intellectual, is partly referring to himself—a prestigious professor of Social History and Political Thought at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED) who in the past decade and a half has become one of the most prominent and prolific historians of twentieth-century Spain. Since 1994, Juliá has not only authored and edited sixteen books, but published more than 500 essays, reviews and columns in the country’s leading newspaper, *El País*. He is also a regular panelist on television. Indeed, Juliá’s own case provides a useful starting point to discuss some of the difficult issues facing Spain’s academic intellectuals today, particularly with regard to their role as heirs to the national-essay tradition—that is, as privileged interpreters of Spain’s national history and identity—at a moment when the nation’s collective self and its relationship to its past are once more the object of heated debate.

I. The Rise of *Columnismo*

A more materialist or institutionally focused discussion of the Spanish academic as public intellectual might begin with a reflection on the phenomenon of *columnismo* in post-Franco Spain. As Alexis Grohmann has shown, the evolution of the Spanish media in the wake of the transition to democracy in the late 1970s resulted in a significant rise of writers’ and intellectuals’ participation in newspapers and magazines, in the shape of opinion essays and reportage or, most frequently, a biweekly, weekly, or even daily newspaper column (Grohmann, “Escritura”; Winter, “Spanische Intellektuelle” 532–35, “Spaniens Intellektuelle” 642). This phenomenon has been relatively well studied for the case of literary authors, for whom the column has become a genre in its own right, in addition to serving as a tremendously effective tool for promoting its author’s work in an increasingly commercial cultural market. The column has also proved a useful stepping stone for journalists with literary aspirations (Neuschäfer 608–12;
The phenomenon of the famous academic with the weekly newspaper column does not sit all that comfortably with Juliá’s image of the modest, responsible intellectual expert who limits his interventions to his area of expertise. True, to be a columnista implies a decision, in Juliá’s words, to “situarse dentro del sistema” (“Intelectuales” 3). Going even further, one could argue that he actively supports the system insofar as he is, in effect, a paid employee of one of Spain’s large media conglomerates. The relationship between the intellectual and his corporate employer is, moreover, highly symbiotic. The academic receives a steady supplement to his university salary; conversely, he is a key selling point for the conglomerate’s media outlets, for whom the fichaje of prominent firmas is as important as the purchase of a pinch hitter for a leading soccer team (Grohmann, “Escrutura”; Neuschäfer). In addition to this commercial relationship, the column shapes the nature of intellectual production in three other important ways. As Juliá himself points out, it demands that the writer observe a strict word limit that is ultimately arbitrary (“Intelectuales” 1). Further, the columnist’s contractual obligations impose a rhythm of production that depends more on the need to fill media space than on the intellectual’s urge to air a particular opinion in response to a social or political development. In practice, the intellectual’s interventions in the public sphere are not prompted by specific thoughts or events but because it is simply that time of the month (Grohmann, “Escrutura”; Winter, “Spanische Intellektuelle” 533–35). Finally, columnismo blurs the line between the academic and journalistic functions of knowledge production, information-providing and opinion-making on the one hand, and profit-generating entertainment on the other (Grohmann, “Escrutura”). All four of these aspects seem to fly in the face of serious intellectual and academic work as it has been traditionally understood, complicating Juliá’s celebratory description of the new intellectual as a modest, responsible expert in a specific area of knowledge.2

II. Guerracivilismo and the Crisis of the Public Sphere

Juliá formulated his arguments about the new intellectual and the demise of the “two Spains” only a couple of years ago. If they seemed naively optimistic then, they do even more now. Any observer of today’s polarized public discourse in Spain would be hard pressed to maintain, for instance, that the concepts of the two Spains or the “Spanish problem” have ceased to be
operative (Ruiz Torres, “Discursos” 17). Nor have Spanish opinion makers abandoned the tendency to view the Spanish nation metaphorically as a collective body suffering from some physical or psychological ailment. For all Juliá’s optimism, the Spanish public sphere, entirely dominated as it is by the intense rivalry between the governing Socialist Party (PSOE) and the oppositional Partido Popular (PP), does not seem to be doing well at all, at least not when measured in the Habermasian terms that Juliá seems to favor. The exchange of ideas is anything but unfettered; rational-critical discourse is in short supply; and there is no mutual respect to speak of. The current state of affairs is what the Spaniards like to refer to as *crispación*; but although the dictionary defines that as a state of tension that is “repentina y pasajera”, in Spanish politics it has become the norm rather than the exception. More worrisome perhaps is the profound politicization of the media—the politicization, that is, of the handful of conglomerates controlling newspapers, television channels, radio stations, book publishing, and internet portals—as well as intellectual debate, which has largely been taking place within the spaces defined and controlled by those same conglomerates. This politicization has served to erode the legitimacy of journalism and scholarship, both of which have traditionally founded their institutional authority on a claim to truth guaranteed by a purported adherence to rigor and objectivity. The aura of disinterestedness necessary to uphold these claims—the notion that scholars’ and journalists’ work does not primarily serve commercial or political interests—has been increasingly difficult to maintain.

Here I wish to focus on the issue of legitimacy and authority, using Juliá’s analysis of Spanish intellectual life, as well as his own case, as a springboard to formulate a set of reflections on the role played by academically affiliated public intellectuals, particularly historians, in the debate around Spain’s “recuperation of historical memory”. My argument has three parts. First, I contend that Juliá is representative of a generation of academics-cum-public-intellectuals who derive their prominent status from their affiliation with the post-Francoist university system, which they emphatically associate with notions of objectivity, rigor, and the disinterested search for truth. As such, they contrast themselves with the scholars of the Francoist era, during which the university subordinated the demands of scholarly rigor to the ideological needs of the regime, but also with other public voices that lack an academic affiliation or qualification, most notably journalists, publicists, politicians, and community leaders. I will also argue, however—and this is my second point—that academics’ claims to scholarly prestige and probity are in tension with their willingness, even eagerness, to work as commentators, *articulistas* or *columnistas*—in tension, that is, with their desire to be fully fledged participants in Spain’s increasingly polarized and commercialized media system. The suspicion driving this essay, in other words, is that intellectuals like Juliá want to have their cake and eat
it, too. My third point is that public academics’ reaction to recent challenges to their legitimacy—a stubborn insistence on their authority as academics—together with their refusal to adapt their claims to fit their changed public role, has made it harder to resolve the current political deadlock in the debate about Spain’s relationship to its twentieth-century past.

The symptoms of what I have called the crisis of the Spanish public sphere—its polarization and commercialization; the blurring of boundaries among information-providing, opinion-making, scholarly knowledge production, and profit-generating entertainment; and the concomitant erosion of academic and journalistic legitimacy as discourses of truth and objectivity—are not peculiar to Spain, of course. Similar developments have been taking place in most of the West, particularly the United States. Still, the Spanish crisis seems particularly severe, and its symptoms particularly pronounced. Another trait that distinguishes the polarizing process in Spain from that in the rest of the West is the fact that Spain’s political discourse is strangely haunted by history, and seemingly prone to an obsessive rehearsal of past conflicts. Examples present themselves wherever one looks. When Spain became a democracy, it adopted a new flag; and yet its Republican and Francoist predecessors appear with increasing frequency at political events. Another tell-tale sign was the chillingly bizarre guerra de las esqueletas or “obit war” that took place in the fall of 2006, as newspapers began featuring ever-larger obituaries which, in ever more aggressively militant terms, claimed to commemorate victims of Nationalist and Republican violence who died seven decades ago (Tesón). Significantly, the obits were neatly divided between conservative and progressive papers, particularly El País and El Mundo. The extent to which media outlets are being linked with political parties became even clearer when, in March 2007, the leadership of the PP decided that its members should boycott all the media outlets controlled by the left-leaning PRISA consortium, long associated with the PSOE. The reason: PRISA’s CEO, Jesús de Polanco, had suggested in a speech to his shareholders that he feared the Spanish Right was aiming for a return to Francoism or even civil war. Mariano Rajoy, secretary general of the PP, immediately declared himself to be “enormemente ofendido”, demanded a retraction, and warned that, until such a retraction was issued, no representative of the party would speak to any PRISA-affiliated journalist—no interviews, no statements, no TV appearances (“Rajoy”).

The crisis even has a lexical dimension. Recent years have seen a sharp rise in the use of the curious term guerracivilismo; not a day goes by, it seems, without the Left and Right accusing each other of “civil-warmongering”. Invented in the 1970s by Francisco Umbral, the word refers to the invocation of the Civil War for one’s own political advantage. A quick LexisNexis survey shows that occurrences in the daily press of guerracivilismo and guerracivilista began to increase markedly in 2004; and everything
indicates that 2007 will be a record year. Ironically, of course, those who hurl the term at their enemies are immediately guilty of the same offense; there is no easier way to leverage the memory of the Civil War to one’s advantage than calling someone else a guerracivilista.

The proliferation of charges like these indicate to what extent Spain’s recent past—the Republic, the Civil War, and Francoism—continues to cast its shadow over the present, at least in rhetorical terms. As the historian Francisco Espinosa puts it, it is a past that refuses to pass (“Saturaciones” 29). Indeed, at no point since the transition to democracy have the 1930s and ’40s been conjured up so frequently and with such insistence as in the last couple of years. Historical analogy has become a preferred device for politicians on the Left and Right. The populares and other conservative groups accuse the current Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, of pursuing a “radical” agenda that, like that of the Republic, threatens Spanish peace, order, and territorial integrity. For the socialistas and their allies on the Left such as Izquierda Unida and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, important sections of the PP still represent an atavistic, authoritarian conservatism that is out of step with the European Right, maintains dangerous connections with neo-Francoist currents, and is bent on undermining the institutions of liberal democracy—just like the Spanish Right did before the war.

These invocations of the past are not entirely arbitrary. After all, the three main points of conflict between the PP and the PSOE are either directly related to the legacy of Francoism, or can be construed as repeats of the ideological struggles of the Republican years. First, there is the Socialists’ push for social liberalization and secularization: the legalization of gay marriage, and the stricter enforcement of the separation between Church and State. Second, there is the government’s relative willingness to negotiate about increased regional autonomy, and its initial openness toward peace talks with the Basque terrorist organization ETA. Third, and most importantly, there is its stated readiness—in response to demands by grassroots movements calling for a “recuperation of historical memory”—to revisit or even redress the amnesty and “amnesia” that marked Spain’s peaceful transition to democracy. Specifically, the government proposed a law, nicknamed “La Ley de Memoria Histórica”, that would allow for a more explicit condemnation of the Franco regime and for state-sponsored forms of recognition of its many victims. In spite of the fact that the law was initially rejected by the Right (for which it went too far) as well as the some parties on the Left (for which it did not go far enough), it was finally passed in late 2007. Meanwhile, the controversy surrounding it has given rise to many gigabytes’ worth of public discourse on historical memory and the relationship of post-Franco Spain to its dictatorial and Civil-War past.

In the remainder of this essay, I will address two problematic aspects of these debates. The first is what one could call their tropology—the fact
that in them, Spain’s relationship to its past has been largely reduced to two rather unhelpful figures of speech that have come to represent the two opposing political camps. Secondly, the evolution of these debates and, more generally, the discontent among groups on the Right and the Left with Spain’s relationship to its past have given rise to a critique and partial displacement from center stage of the generation of academic historians that dominated the public discourse on twentieth-century history for the twenty-five years following the Transition. Since the late 1990s, this discourse has been increasingly driven by non-academic groups and individuals. The historians’ response to their partial loss of discursive hegemony and public-sphere legitimacy, however, has not been very helpful, either, as they have insisted on their authority as academics and refused to attempt to understand what motivates their critics. Thus, I will argue, they have aggravated the ideological deadlock rather than helping to resolve it. Again, Santos Juliá—as an academic historian, a public intellectual, and one of the most prominent critics of the public debates about the past and the demands for its “recuperation”—will serve as our main example.

III. Two Master Tropes

The main dispute concerning Spain’s relationship with its past can be put in relatively simple terms: at stake are the meaning and consequences of Spain’s transition to democracy. For the Right, the picture is straightforward: the transition accomplished the much-desired national reconciliation; the political pact between the representatives of the Franco regime and the anti-Francoist opposition—based on a mutual, general amnesty and the interpretation of the war as “un error histórico” or period of collective madness in which no one was without blame (Sánchez León 113)—allowed all Spaniards to put the past behind them, move on, and focus on the present and the future. Some groups on the Left, by contrast, have been arguing with increasing insistence that the transition was incomplete or even flawed. Its combination of amnesty and amnesia, they claim, in effect robbed the Republican side from the opportunity to properly mourn and honor its victims, to restore their memory and good name, and to condemn the abuses of the Franco regime. Not only had the regime spent forty years lavishly honoring its victims, but its physical traces were left largely intact, in street names, statues, and monuments. Moreover, since the transition failed entirely to address the human-rights abuses committed during and after the war, it continues to pose a judicial problem to Spain’s young democracy. Each of these opposing positions invokes a different master trope to define Spain’s relationship to its past. The Left has rallied around the call for a “recuperation of historical memory” (recuperación de la memoria histórica). The Right, in turn, warns against the “opening of old wounds”
(abrir viejas heridas). Both tropes are problematic, in different ways.

The notion that revisiting the conflicts of the past can be compared to the opening of old wounds invokes what one could call a “lazy” vision of overcoming historical trauma. Inspired by the adage that time heals all wounds, it suggests that trauma is cured best when left alone. The metaphor also suggests that going against this “natural” process of oblivion by recalling the past, by refusing to forget, is neurotic and counterproductive: insistent recollection can even open up wounds that had, in fact, already healed (restañado, cicatrizado). Being medical and physical, the trope is emphatically not psychological. It rejects the idea that overcoming a traumatic past implies any form of conscious effort or emotional hardship. The past is not really something one has to “come to terms” with at all; there is no need to “work it up”, or “work through” it; no reprocessing (Aufarbeitung) is required, no controlling or mastering (Bewältigung), to invoke the two terms most often associated with the German case.

The Left’s preferred trope, la recuperación de la memoria histórica, has spread as widely as the old wounds figure, and is invoked as unthinkingly. In practice it is used to refer to a large number of practices and positions that engage with Francoist repression in very different ways (Torres Ruiz, “Discursos”). These include the undertaking and publication of historical research, the organization of memorial ceremonies or reenactments, the creation of commemorative art and literature, the exhumation of mass graves, and the call for political, legislative, and judicial action. The groups that identify themselves with the trope—the Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (ARMH), founded by the journalist Emilio Silva in 2000, and its dozens of local and national offshoots—demand that the history of Francoist repression during and after the war be investigated, broadcast and taught more widely; and that its victims be acknowledged, honored, and exonerated from the alleged crimes attributed to them by the Franco regime.

Still, this trope, too, has doubtful implications. It implies that traumatic memories remain preserved, and not only can but should be retrieved. The notion of recuperation, moreover, suggests that the object to be recuperated was hidden, lost, or stolen, and associates its return or reappearance with notions of justice or the restoration of proper order. Recuperar, according to the Real Academia, means “Volver a tomar o adquirir lo que antes se tenía”, but also “Volver a un estado de normalidad después de haber pasado por una situación difícil.” Here, too, there is a direct link with Spain’s national-essay tradition, in which intellectuals like Unamuno, Ganivet, Maeztu or Calvo Serer aspired for Spain to recuperate its true self and, with it, its glorious national destiny.

The very notion of “historical memory”, moreover, is potentially deceptive. To be sure, in particular contexts it can be used to designate the
public, well-known record of the collective, communal past as it is represented in the public sphere, understood in terms of discourse as well as space: in the media, in textbooks, in monuments, ceremonies, and the like. In this sense, the call to recuperate historical memory largely expresses the legitimate desire that certain individual and collective memories which had remained private, hidden, and unofficial, be incorporated into the public, visible and audible public record (Labanyi 109–10). However, the notion of historical memory is problematic insofar as it suggests that memory is an object that is, as such, recuperable, and that, moreover, collective memory is a homogenous, unified and singular entity (Naharro, “Trenes” 102; Ruiz Torres, “Discursos” 16). In the end, “recuperar la memoria” also represents the process of coming to terms with the past as a relatively simple operation that involves little effort—and, more important, no significant sacrifice or change on the part of the recuperating party (Labanyi 106–07). The trope further seems to suggest a neat division between victim and victimizer, implying that another party is to blame for the current abnormal state of oblivion.

IV. Critique of the Academic Establishment

Groups on both sides in this battle over Spain’s relationship to its past have sharply criticized the post-Franco academic establishment. The citizen organizations calling for the recuperation of historical memory, and many of the texts, films and web sites exposing Francoist repression, have directly or indirectly charged academic historians with not doing enough to expose the crimes of the past (Richards). In response, there has been a counter-wave of books, films, and articles by conservative intellectuals defending the accomplishments of Franco and his regime, downplaying its repressive character, and more generally questioning the liberal-progressive interpretations of twentieth-century Spanish history that, they claim, have dominated academic discourse in post-Franco Spain. The most visible among these so-called “revisionists” have been Pío Moa and César Vidal. Both are very prolific; and perhaps the most remarkable feature of their writings has been their formidable commercial success. Although Moa’s books enjoyed the support of the powerful conservative media, his popularity is astounding—especially given the fact that, as many critics have pointed out, he largely recycles the versions of the Republic and the Civil War that were established in the 1960s by Francoist historians like Ricardo de la Cierva (Graham).

According to Sánchez León, the wide popular resonance of both the right-wing revisionists and the “recuperation movement” is an indication of an increasing dissatisfaction among the public with the approaches and interpretations of Francoism and the Civil War that dominated among
professional historians. During the decades following the transition to democracy, these historians held something of a monopoly on the legitimate representation of twentieth-century history. With regards to the Civil War, moreover, they operated under the assumption that historical knowledge would and should become increasingly “objective”, that is, impartial or non-partisan with respect to the warring factions (Sánchez-León 97, 117–18, 130; Izquierdo Martín and Sánchez León 48–64). In effect, the recent widening and politicization of the debate—fueled by a remarkable amount of non-academic, politicized books, documentaries, debates, reportage, and events about the Republic, the Civil War, and Francoism—has undermined these claims and diminished historians’ power and prestige. As Sánchez León explains, the academic generation that shaped the legitimate or official discourse about the country’s history since 1931 had been socialized in the “nunca más” version of the war as “un error histórico”—a vision of the war that became hegemonic in the later years of Francoism, and remained so for almost four decades. For these historians, the academic practice of history, conceived as impartial, objective, and based on pure fact, became the medium par excellence to “expresar la distancia entre el pasado y el presente” (113). Sánchez León points out, however, that the pretense of objectivity was undermined from the beginning by the shared assumption—the prejudice, really—that the Civil War had indeed been an “historical error”; that it should have never happened; and that it should never happen again (116). The disinterestedness, dispassionateness and impartiality that were touted as the foundations of rigorous scholarly practice, then, fulfilled two additional functions: they were conceived as the polar opposites of the interests, passions, and partisanship that were believed to have caused the “collective madness” of 1936–39, and as the moral foundations of Spain’s new democratic culture. In other words, a particular notion of scholarly rigor was conflated with a very specific interpretation of Spanish history and with the socio-political attitude that was thought indispensable for a peaceful transition to democracy. While the grass-roots calls for “historical memory” and the commercial success of Pío Moa are two very different phenomena, they are both symptomatic of the polarization of the Spanish public, fueled by an equally politicized, polarized and commercialized media. Both also point to a widespread desire for a different version of twentieth-century history, however, and for a different kind of relationship with the collective past—manifesting a “thirst for history” or “memory” in a country whose four successive democratic governments never dared establish anything resembling a national consensus on the historical narrative of the Civil War and Francoism (Richards; Winter, “Spaniens Intellektuelle” 647). In the process, the emergence of people like Moa and Silva—neither of whom is a trained historian, let alone an academic—has forced Spanish academic
historians like Juliá to redefine their own function as representers of the collective past, and to reassert their relevance, legitimacy, and authority as scholars. As we will see, however, their defense has been rather weak.

V. Academics on the Defense
At first, historians’ response to the critiques from Left and Right were slow, ornery, and formalistic. Some initially preferred to ignore Moa altogether, considering that, as an a non-academic and propagandist, he was not worthy of their serious attention (Stradling 448–49). Others would have liked to disregard Moa on the same grounds but could not help themselves. Thus, when Moa was sympathetically interviewed on prime-time Spanish national television in early 2003, Javier Tusell wrote a scathing column in *El País* in which he branded Moa’s appearance as “perverse”. According to Tusell, Moa did not deserve the space, seriousness, and sympathy that he was granted, being as he was a former terrorist (in the seventies, Moa belonged to the GRAPO, a left-wing terrorist organization inspired by Maoism), a neo-Francoist, and, above all, an *amateur* (Tusell). For several years, the most prominent exception to the tactics of *ningueno* of Moa, Vidal, and their likes had been Enrique Moradiellos at the University of Extremadura, who early on engaged in long drawn-out polemics with Moa and his allies in the pages of the *Revista de Libros* and the online journal *El Catoblepas*, directed by the maverick philosopher Gustavo Bueno. As time passed, however, and Moa kept writing and selling, historians became more combative. In 2003, Alberto Reig Tapia wrote an aggressive critique (“Quosque”) that, expanded into booklength, was published in 2006 as *Anti-Moa*. In June 2005 Julián Casanova, of a younger generation than Tusell and Juliá, warned his colleagues that they could no longer afford to let Moa get away with his “persuasive lies” (“Mentiras”).

In comparison to Moa, the academic response to Emilio Silva and other proponents of the *recuperación de la memoria histórica* has been generally more sympathetic. Groups of local historians have expressed their support for the movement’s aims, or even joined it. Still, the older and more established generation of academics has been more hesitant in their endorsements. Among those most dismissive of the recuperation movement has been Santos Juliá, who in the past ten years has profiled himself as a staunch defender of the transition to democracy. Juliá rejects the notion that the adoption of a blanket amnesty was in any way a sell-out to the interests of the Franco regime. For one, he argues, the anti-Francoist opposition accepted amnesty as the only viable way forward as early as the 1950s; moreover, the key part of the amnesty law was proposed and adopted by the first democratically elected parliament after Franco’s death (“Memoria, historia” 42–56). Juliá has also declared himself in sharp
disagreement with the notion that the transition gave rise to any “forgetfulness” with regard to Francoism and the war. Pointing to the large number of memoirs, films, and historical research published on those periods since the late 1970s, he has argued that the whole notion that Spain suffered from a form of “collective amnesia” is patently absurd (“De guerra” 48–49). What drove the transition, he writes, was a collective determination not to let the past determine the future of the country (“Memoria, historia” 40). This implied “echar al olvido” the war and Francoism—not forgetting it, but remembering it in order to make sure that their legacy would not continue to cloud the country’s destiny (46, 57–69; “Nuestras memorias” 13; Labanyi 93). Since Juliá rejects the critique of the transition that is one of the basic premises behind the grassroots call for the recuperación de la memoria histórica, he has not had much patience with the groups voicing it. In fact, he has regularly used his ready access to the media to question the slogans, goals, and modus operandi of the recuperation movement, while simultaneously defending his own generation’s treatment of Spanish history.

In the process, however, Juliá has not only been strangely reluctant to understand the movement’s aims and motivation, but has also established a dogmatic conceptual framework that, rather than strengthening the academic historians’ position, ends up weakening it.

Juliá’s main strategy of critique has been to draw a radical distinction between “history” and “memory” as two diametrically opposed phenomena, and to warn of the dangers involved in confusing the two—which he believes is precisely what the recuperation movement is doing. In the presentation and long introduction to Memoria de la guerra y del franquismo (2006), for instance, Juliá characterizes history as a practice which “se ocupa de buscar la verdad” about the past. History “es una cuestión de estudio, de documentación, de lectura y aspira a la universalidad” (17). It seeks to “conocer, comprender, interpretar o explicar” the past, working “bajo la exigencia de la totalidad y objetividad” and using “los instrumentos propios de la crítica” (Presentación 17–19). History, for Juliá, aims not to remember the past but to know it. Moreover, the knowledge it produces is cumulative, so that as time passes scholars get ever closer to the truth (18).

Memory, on the other hand, does not aim to know the past as it really was; rather, it constructs a representation of the past to satisfy political, emotional, or commercial needs of the present. Worse, it lends itself for mobilization in the service of unsavory aims. Memory, Juliá writes, “es una cuestión de política, de celebración, de voluntad” (18). While historical knowledge steadily accumulates in its approximation of truth, memory is fickle and opportunistic: “está sometida a un cambio permanente, inducido por las exigencias del presente, por la biografía de quien quiere recordar, por lo que se decide olvidar, por las políticas de la historia elaboradas desde los poderes
públicos o por meras oportunidades e incitaciones del mercado”. Moreover, because “la memoria pretende legitimar, rehabilitar, honrar o condenar”, it always operates “de manera selectiva y subjetiva” (Presentación 17). For Juliá, then, history is hard facts; memory is a mere story.

Seeing history and memory as radically opposed, Juliá is inclined to reject any notion of “historical memory” as a silly oxymoron. So-called historical memory, he writes, “no es más que el resultado de las políticas, públicas o privadas, de la historia, esto es, de la pedagogía de sentido que un determinado poder pretende dar al pasado para legitimar una actuación en el presente” (Presentación 19). Juliá’s position was articulated in even starker terms by a fellow professor of history in an op-ed piece for the Periódico de Extremadura. “La Historia”, Alfonso Pinilla wrote, “es el conocimiento científico de los hechos pasados, a través de hipótesis explicativas, ensayos metodológicos y pruebas documentales. La Memoria es construcción personal, social, sentimental, ideológica, pero no científica, del ayer. […] La Historia es conocimiento, la Memoria representación. […] El memoriodor inventa, el historiador conoce” (Pinilla).

Juliá is not entirely mistaken, of course. He is right to be skeptical of the haphazard ways in which the concept of historical memory is being invoked in Spain today; he is also right to remind us that the historian’s work is fundamentally informed by critique, rigor, and the observance of scholarly norms. As various commentators have pointed out, however, he paints himself into a rhetorical corner. In his desire to defend the epistemological and institutional integrity and legitimacy of the historical profession against the claims and criticisms of the recuperation movement and the right-wing revisionists, Juliá curiously loses sight of the historicity, social context, and diversity of historiographical practice itself, and ends up constructing an ideal concept of historiography based on untenably radical notions of realism, individualism, and empiricism (Ruiz Torres, “Perplejidades”).

Juliá’s position has four specific problems. First, it is naively empiricist. Although he admits that the historians’ search for la verdad is never-ending, and that historians, too, tell “stories” (relatos), his rigid distinction between history and memory as based on the difference between fact and representation seems to imply that the historian somehow has direct access to the factual past wie es eigentlich gewesen, to invoke Ranke’s famous dictum, while memory is hopelessly marred by the fact that it is made of narrative. In reality, of course, it is impossible to separate fact from representation in this way; Hayden White showed long ago that historians cannot but produce narratives of the past, and that historiography is therefore subject to the same cultural conventions that rule all forms of story-telling. In this context Hayden White also famously argued that “to narrativize is to moralize” (25). Santos Juliá, by contrast, appears to claim that the historian
can do her work in a moral vacuum. He thus ends up presenting the historian—and the principles of historiography—in a strangely a-historical light. Memory, he states, responds to changing social and political needs of the present; history, by contrast, operates in a value-free realm of pure scholarly research. But Juliá’s scholarly norms are historically determined and socially embedded, and no less subject to the needs of the present than the discourses he brands as mere memory.

Second, the clear discursive separation that Juliá establishes between history and memory is belied by the institutional realities outlined above, which Juliá skirts entirely. Do the evolution, structure, and politics of the Spanish university, for instance, warrant the assumption that the work of academic historians is unmarked by the political, emotional, and commercial needs of the present? As we have seen, the professional historians of post-Franco Spain have been anything but holed up in their ivory towers; to the contrary, they have become active participants in a commercialized and polarized public sphere. Can academic historians continue to claim a privileged position as producers of pure knowledge if part of their work is presented in the same media space as that of journalists and non-academic intellectuals? Or should we assume that they are able to establish a neat separation between their paid work as columnistas, articulistas, or television panelists and their disinterested pursuit of scholarly knowledge?

A third problem of Juliá’s conception of “objective” history as radically opposed to “subjective” memory is his apparent marginalization of the witness as a primary source of knowledge about the past. As Ruiz Torres and Günther Swaiger have pointed out, Juliá’s blanket dismissal of “memory” places the historian and his work in a strange kind of suspension (Ruiz Torres, “Discursos” 21). Are individuals’ subjective experiences of the past not worth incorporating into the historian’s work? What would the historian do without accounts from witnesses? As Swaiger writes, it is hard not to interpret Juliá’s position as an expression of sheer institutional arrogance or academic muscle-flexing: “¿Hemos llegado a tal arrogancia académica que las víctimas tengan que pedir permiso a los historiadores para saber si su sufrimiento fue verdad o simplemente un espejismo?” (Swaiger).

Juliá’s reluctance to think of the historian’s work as a socially embedded practice that is intimately linked up with—and not exclusive of—the subjective and political, also explains why he has such a hard time accounting for the tremendous changes that have been occurring in the way that large parts of Spanish society think about the country’s twentieth-century past. Indeed, Juliá has trouble recognizing that things have changed at all. And attacked as he feels by the claims of the recuperation movement, he is unwilling to put much effort into trying to understand it. Instead, he prefers to see it as driven by ignorance and dangerous conceptual confusion. With respect to the charge that key moments of Francoist repression like
the assassination of the thirteen young women known as “Las Trece Rosas” have been forgotten, for instance, Juliá admits that it is surely “moralmente encomiable” to keep the memory of those victims alive. But, he adds, historians have long known about the Trece Rosas, and duly recorded the details of the killing. Therefore there has been no olvido; anyone interested in the story could have easily gone to the library and looked it up. Thus, Juliá concludes, the present outrage of some people who first hear about the Trece Rosas is not due to any oblivion but simply to their own ignorance (Presentación 21). Juliá’s positing knowledge of history as an individual’s responsibility allows him to dismiss the whole notion that widespread ignorance of Francoist repression is a collective phenomenon that may call for collective solutions.

Similarly, and this is the fourth problem, Juliá’s view of his scholarly practice does not seem to leave any room for the ways in which the historian’s work—from the choice of subject to its treatment and focus—is influenced by, and in turn shapes, wider social, political and institutional structures and processes. As Sánchez León notes, however, “ni los historiadores ni quienes en general interpretan hechos históricos, sean o no profesionales, están al margen de [los] procesos sociales” (“Objetividad” 98). Historians, like everyone else, are subject to “las convenciones de los grupos profesionales y sociales más amplios de los que forman parte”: “el historiador no puede elegir estar por encima de su tiempo, ni de las convenciones de su entorno social” (98, 125). As Ruiz Torres writes, “la historia en absoluto resulta ajena ni puede serlo al uso social y político de la misma en discursos impregnados de juicios de valor y con fines prácticos” (“Discursos” 25). Juliá’s apparent unwillingness to acknowledge the social nature and impact of his work as a historian is doubly strange in someone who occupies such a prominent public position, yielding considerable influence in the court of public opinion.

Sánchez León argues that it is precisely the academic historians’ disregard for history as a social practice and a subjective experience that the recuperation movement is trying to remedy (Sánchez León 131). The Spanish academy may well have produced mountains of studies on the Civil War and Francoist repression, but the public impact of those studies was long negligible because historians’ findings barely trickled down (Ruiz Torres, “Discursos” 21). As a result, few people saw any need to modify the older representations and narratives of the past; and those whose personal memories of suffering had been repressed throughout the years of Francoism still did not feel they could bring them up in public. This is also the weak spot in Juliá’s argument that the transition spurred anything but amnesia. As Francisco Espinosa wrote in response to Alfonso Pinilla’s essay quoted above, Pinilla’s position “alberga un visible, aunque no manifiesto, deseo de que la Historia no salga de la Academia (o quizás más bien de que vuelva
a ella). Pero yo siento decirle, y hablo pensando en el país en general, que si tal cosa ha ocurrido ha sido en parte porque la Academia olvidó su función social” (Espinosa, “Historia”). “[E]l relato producido por los historiadores”, Sánchez León writes, “un relato impersonal y con una falsa equidistancia, se ha ido mostrando incapaz con el tiempo de satisfacer los cambios en la sensibilidad del público en materia de memoria colectiva” (130–31).

The large majority of recent publications under the aegis of la recuperación de la memoria histórica, by contrast, emphasize “el punto de vista subjetivo”: “La memoria colectiva ha entrado en rebeldía, y su reclamo es, qué duda cabe, una historia con sujeto” (Sánchez León 131). Juliá does not seem to ask himself for whom, exactly, the historian writes—in fact, his vision of his own practice does not really allow him to ask that question—and how, and at what point, the fruit of the historian’s labor is absorbed into society at large, particularly the educational system. It is easy to reject state-sponsored versions or policies of national memory as opportunistic, legitimizing, and ephemeral “representations”; but school children have to be taught something in their history class; their textbooks have to tell some story.¹⁸

The vehemence of Juliá’s polemics about history and memory, as well as his impatience with those who disagree with him, suggest that there might be more at stake than disagreements over epistemology. Indeed, the conflict is not just between Juliá’s generation of historians and emerging non-academic social actors; the issue of historical memory has divided the scholarly community itself as well, leading to sharp confrontations between Juliá and fellow historians.¹⁹ One suspects that what masks as a dispute over epistemology, method, and social function is really a generational struggle in response to a paradigm shift. This impression is confirmed by a revealing essay that Juliá published in the Revista de Occidente in the summer of 2006. The opening paragraph marks Juliá’s position as a senior historian, expressing his frustration with the changed spirit of the times:

Antes, hace como unos treinta años, nos interesaba qué había ocurrido durante la República y la guerra civil: establecer los hechos, interpretar los textos, analizar las situaciones. Hoy, cuando una nueva generación de historiadores, literatos, críticos de la cultura nacidos en torno a la transición ha pasado a ocupar la primera fila, ya no interesa tanto lo que ha pasado sino su memoria; no los hechos sino sus representaciones, que adquieren una especie de existencia autónoma, independiente de los hechos representados (“Bajo el imperio” 7).

The subtle switch from first-person plural (“nos interesaba”) to the impersonal third person (“ya no interesa”) is telling here: Juliá feels out of touch. More important, he seems to feel personally threatened by the increasing encroachment of memory on history, his realm; the marginalization of facts, interpretation, and analysis by autonomous “representations”. For Juliá, the popularity of memory is related to a more general
disenchantment with history as a tool for social transformation; memory has shown itself much more malleable to the political needs of the present.

Whereas history operates in a morally neutral dialectic between knowledge and ignorance—there is no guilt in not knowing—the proponents of “memory”, while fighting against “oblivion”, also denounce forgetfulness in moral terms: “Lo que realmente se nos dice cuando se nos exige recuperar la memoria es que hemos olvidado culpablemente a los fusilados, a las Trece Rosas, a los enterrados en fosas, a los presos en campos de concentración” (“Bajo el imperio” 9–10). Juliá has strong objections against this link between collective memory or oblivion and collective guilt, which in his view harkens back to a dubious, organicist vision of society. For Juliá, any notion of collective memory quickly becomes prescriptive, landing us straight into nationalism or, worse, authoritarianism.

Juliá explains that his own rejection of historical memory is rooted in his experience of official Francoist memory, forcibly imposed on the citizenry. His generation of social scientists was much more interested “no en recordar, sino en conocer el pasado, en investigar, en saber qué pasó: la memoria recibida había ocultado la verdadera historia”, and understandably reluctant to replace the Francoist myths by any alternative collective memory (“Bajo el imperio” 12). For Juliá’s generation of historians, recent history was fragmented and contradictory, impossible to turn into any coherent narrative or guide for the present. And that was a good thing: they did not want to be guided by the Civil War: “La guerra era sencillamente historia, objeto de conocimiento, no de memoria; su herencia no era bien venida” (14).

It was this generation of social scientists which, in the 1970s and 1980s, undertook the formidable task of scholarly investigation into the facts and circumstances of the Republic, the Civil War, and Francoism—a field dominated until then by British, American, and French historians, and almost completely unexplored by the Spaniards. Again, though, his generation’s experience with mythified Francoist memory led to see its scholarly work, emphatically, not as a tool for settling moral or political accounts (“Bajo el imperio” 16). The next generation of scholars, who had not lived the imposition of Francoist memory, balked at this inattention to morality and justice: “dijeron: aquí no se ha hecho justicia porque se ha olvidado a los vencidos, a los que combatieron por la causa de la República y sufrieron luego depuraciones, cárceles, fusilamientos. Nadie se ha acordado de ellos, nadie ha reivindicado su memoria, la legitimidad de su causa, nadie les ha organizado un homenaje” (17). For Juliá, the problem with this conception of the historian as moral judge is that it runs into trouble in the context to the Civil War, for which, given its very nature, there is no one historical memory to be “recuperated”. Moreover, the idea that history can serve the adjudication of judicial guilt is illusory. In the end, the truth is that
innocent people were killed on both sides, and “por mucho que los historiadores, sociólogos o antropólogos establezcan diferencias entre las distintas formas de violencia, es imposible calificar jurídicamente de distinta manera el mismo delito”. That is why, for Juliá, “las guerras civiles sólo pueden terminar en una amnistía general” (19).

VI. History as Pedagogy

In defense of his position, Juliá has quoted Tony Judt’s defense of history as a critical practice in the face of the current “cult of commemoration” and emphasis on victimhood. Memory, Judt writes in the epilogue to his Postwar, “is a poor guide to the past”, and the “suggestion that all forms of victimhood are essentially comparable, even interchangeable” in fact leads to a moral and judicial maze since, in the end, every community can be construed as a victim of something (829; Judt’s emphasis). Indulging in memories of hurt, moreover, is harmful to society; “[s]ome measure of neglect and even forgetting is the necessary condition for civic health” (829). History, the critical and rigorous investigation of the past, is indispensable for a democratic society.

Unlike Juliá, however, Judt pays explicit attention to the wider social impact of the historian’s work. Forgetting or moving on, he states, can only happen after a thorough exercise in remembering—an exercise that for Judt is very public and not limited to the realm of scholarly research (829–30). Similarly, when Judt talks about history, he does not simply talk about scholarly knowledge production, but about knowledge as a pedagogic subject matter. History, for Judt, is very much about learning:

Unlike memory, which confirms and reinforces itself, history contributes to the disenchantment of the world. Most of what it has to offer is disconcerting, even disruptive—which is why it is not always politically prudent to wield the past as a moral cudgel with which to beat and berate a people for its past sins. But history does need to be learned—and periodically re-learned (830).

Thus, “if Europe’s past is to continue to furnish Europe’s present with admonitory meaning and moral purpose [...] it will have to be taught afresh with each passing generation” (831; Judt’s emphasis). Here, Judt’s notion of history begins to overlap with Paloma Aguilar’s definition of historical memory—that part of the collective past that is remembered and from which lessons are drawn (Aguilar 1)—and therefore moves away from Juliá’s positivistic stance.

Juliá’s position can be summarized in a series of paradoxes. The call for, and celebration of, memory is for him a dangerous phenomenon because he believes that it all too quickly leads to the imposition of a single version of the past driven by the present political needs of certain social groups
in power.\textsuperscript{20} In reality, however, Juliá’s definition of “history” as memory’s polar opposite—and his refusal to acknowledge the historicity of history as a practice, which in turn allows him to postulate history as “pure”, cumulative knowledge about the “truth” of the past—in effect leads him to what he claims to fear: the assumption that there is only one true version of the past (Ruiz Torres, “Discursos” \textsuperscript{18}). The idea, moreover, that this true version of the past can only be discovered and formulated by a particular social group—professional historians—leads him to a kind of mandaristic arrogance, dismissing all those who are too ignorant to inform themselves of the historians’ findings. A similar impression of arrogance is created by his apparent disdain for the victims and their family members who largely make up the recuperation movement, and by his parallel dismissal of individual memory as a subjective experience of the past. Juliá, seeing himself as an independent scholar and champion of secular, commonsensical, liberal pluralism, warns against “memory” as the stuff that totalitarian regimes employ to impose a single version of the past on their citizens; and yet it is Juliá who occupies the position of institutional power vis-à-vis the recuperation movement, aggressively defending his monopoly as a producer of a legitimate, “objective” discourse about Spanish history. In a final paradox, Juliá thus ends up embodying the kind of intellectual whose disappearance he had celebrated: the \textit{estrella polar} who thinks it his job to enlighten the masses, and who sees himself as the privileged teller of authoritative stories about the nation’s past.

The generation that orchestrated, and feels invested in, the transition to democracy has a hard time stomaching the criticism of younger scholars and intellectuals. The identity of leftist-liberal academics of Juliá’s generation is not only tied to the transition as a success story—and to the Civil War as un “error histórico” that is important to understand scholarly but whose passions and conflicts should be banned from the present—but also with a very specific image of themselves as independent, rigorous, objective, and authoritative scholars. As we have seen, the rejection of political interests and passions, or for that matter any affective, moral, or vindicating approach to historical scholarship, was more than a commitment to scholarly objectivity: it was also seen as a guarantee that the Civil War would happen never again. The problem is that, given the developments in of the Spanish media, cultural industry, and public sphere, this generation of academics has come to occupy an institutional position that is much more hybrid, and much less pure, than their self-image of the objective, disinterested and dispassionate scholar would seem to indicate. New generations of intellectual voices from within and outside the university, meanwhile, reject the notion of de-policitized, disinterested, dispassionate and impersonal history in favor of an identification with specific political struggles, and a re-infusion of Spain’s twentieth-century history with the affectivity and subjectivity
that Juliá’s generation did their best to keep out. At the same time, they are rebelling against the reluctance of Juliá’s generation to let go of their long-standing monopoly on the discourse about the past—and against their powerful institutional positions as public opinion makers.

VII. Epilogue

Although recent developments in Spain have been explained as the consequences of a particularly Spanish dynamic, the international dimension cannot be ignored (Ruiz Torres, “Discursos” 13). The entire Western world has experienced a growing interest in issues of historical memory and transitional justice, spurred in part by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of military dictatorships in the Southern Cone. Over the past ten years or so, in fact, a nation’s relationship to its troubled past has become something of an international moral touchstone. This is especially true for Europe, which, as Judt has come to embrace the willingness to face one’s own collective misdeeds—particularly with respect to the Holocaust—as a defining characteristic of its continental identity. In fact, acknowledgement of collective guilt has now become a more or less explicit condition for EU membership (803). Thus, Turkey will likely be kept out of the Union as long as its government refuses to acknowledge the Armenian genocide of 1915, and “Serbia will continue to languish on the European doorstep until its political class takes responsibility for the mass murders and other crimes of the Yugoslav wars” (804).

It is interesting to speculate what would have happened if Spain had not made it into the European Community when it did, in 1986, and were applying for membership now. Would Spain have been subjected to the same pressures as Serbia and Turkey? Would it have been asked to set up a Truth Commission? Would Manuel Fraga, a former member of Franco’s government who remained a prominent politician in the post-Franco era, be obliged publicly to acknowledge his complicity with a repressive regime? Would the Spanish government be asked to redesign the Valley of the Fallen, built to suit Franco’s ideological needs and practically unchanged since its inauguration in 1959? The hypotheticals may seem a bit silly; yet they are not implausible. Spain was lucky to get into the European club when the moral membership requirements were less strict. And if truth be told, the country is still not really taken to task. Compared to other, more recent cases such as Chile, Argentina, or South Africa, international pressure on Spain to redefine its relationship to its own past has been remarkably light; only Amnesty International has seriously pushed for a change in policy and attitudes (Amnistía). True, this relative absence of international pressure might well be a good thing; as Judt shows, it took the other Europeans quite a while too to arrive at their present, enlightened state. One could
argue that the Spaniards should be given a chance to figure things out among themselves. The question is whether they will be able to. The Law of Historical Memory was passed; but the PP’s continued opposition to almost all of its articles, as well as polarizing counteroffensives such as the almost simultaneous beatification in Rome of some 500 Catholic martyrs killed during the Civil War, indicate that the law’s introduction and long drawn-out negotiations have not succeeded in overcoming the lingering division of the dos Españas—to the contrary.

Notes
1 Describing the situation in the 1990s, Winter points out that access to the media is no longer guaranteed by academic authority alone, and that professional success plays an increasingly important part (Winter, “Spanische Intellektuelle” 518). Similarly, he notes that it is not always clear whether the authority of public academics is based on their scholarly work or on the fact that they have access to the mass media (534).
2 As Pedro Sorela writes, “lo que caracteriza al opinador a plazo fijo es, como su propio nombre indica, la obligación de tener una opinión sobre asuntos diversos en un plazo de tiempo nunca amplio. Y asuntos que por su propia naturaleza periodística, esto es, de trascendencia pública, son de una cierta complejidad, aunque el tratamiento columnístico, su lenguaje, sea por definición simplificador” (Sorela 19).
3 In January 2007, the magazine El Cultural featured four prominent historians’ answers to four questions about nationalism, immigration, violence, and the country’s lack of “vertebration”, under the heading “España, ¿de nuevo como problema?” <http://www.elcultural.es/historico_articulo.asp?c=19495>.
4 “Hay quien desea volver a la Guerra Civil. Acabamos de ver una manifestación que es el franquismo puro y duro”; “Si estos señores recuperan el poder, van a venir con unas ganas de revancha que a mí, personalmente, me da mucho miedo” (“Polanco”).
5 A Google search for guerracivilismo(s) and guerracivilista(s) gives more than 75,000 hits.
6 In his Diario de un snob he wrote, complaining about the negative stereotypes associated with Spain in the rest of Europe, “La verdad es que todavía hay españoles que salimos al mundo, vacunados y revacunados, con el certificado en regla, curados de españolismo, de inquisitorialismo, de piromanía, de guerracivilismo” (278). In 1997, Umbral invoked his term to denounce the idea, launched by the Socialist Party, of a judicial persecution of Francoists, particularly Manuel Fraga (“Guerracivilismo”).
7 Rob Stradling dates the beginning of this phenomenon to 1996 (443).
8 In December 2002, then Prime Minister Aznar declared, in response to a question about the possibility of an official government apology to the victims of Francoism: “There is no reason why I should apologize for anything. The history of the Spanish transition is a history of profound reconciliation, and that is a basis on which we have to continue working” (qtd in Silva, Fosas 118; my translation).
9 The literature on these processes is of course vast. It is worth recalling Theodor W. Adorno’s warning that “Coming to terms with the past does not imply a serious working through of the past, the breaking of its spell through an act of clear consciousness. It suggests, rather, wishing to turn the page and, if possible, wiping it from memory” (Adorno 115). See also Lüdtke.
11 As Paloma Aguilar writes in Memory and Amnesia, historical memory is a collective concept, an “abstraction and simplification of the plurality of memories that exists within any given society” (6); a nation’s historical memory is “that part of the past which, as a result of a certain situation or context, has the ability to influence the present” or which has “immediate relevance to the
present and exert[s] some kind of influence on it” (9, 16). Aguilar emphasizes that historical or collective memory combines “substance” and “values”; that is, it encapsulates not just what happened in the past, but the lessons that can be drawn from it: “collective memory […] consists of the memory that a community possesses of its own history, as well as the lessons and learning which it more or less consciously extracts from that memory” (1). See also Ruiz Torres for an extensive and nuanced discussion of different types and theories of memory; for him, historical memory is “el recuerdo de un pasado cada vez menos reciente y que sin embargo no se ha convirtido en pasado distante, un pasado que continúa despertando pasiones y controversias en el presente. Ese pasado no es el pasado histórico de una nación o de cualquier otro grupo, sino el pasado de unos acontecimientos traumáticos (guerra, represión, exterminio) que en pleno siglo XX y a partir del periodo de entreguerras trajeron regímenes dictatoriales nuevos y de distinto carácter a escala mundial” (“Perplejidades” 39). In a lucid summary of the issue, Carolyn Boyd points out that, strictly speaking, academic history is part of a society’s social memory (82).

1 Moa’s Los mitos de la guerra civil (2003) sold 150,000 copies in its first year, and another 100,000 in the two years following.

13 Juliá himself has maintained a remarkable silence in the face of the right-wing revisionists, with the exception of a lengthy response to a positive review by Stanley Payne of Moa’s Mitos in the Revista de libros. After upbraiding Payne for a series of dismissive comments about recent historical scholarship on the Spanish Civil War, and giving a long list of valuable new studies, he writes that it is impossible to include in this list “el libro que tantos elogios merece del desdeñoso crítico, pues no pertenece ese libro al ámbito de la investigación sino, más bien, al de la propaganda” (“Últimas noticias” 8). On Payne’s endorsement of Moa, see also Ealham 370 and Stradling 449.


15 “Es falso que los años setenta fueran tiempos de silencio […] Es una falsedad que se repite una y otra vez por los profesionales de la recuperación de la memoria y por críticos culturales aficionados al psicoanálisis de sujetos colectivos, que no pierden el tiempo investigando todo lo que entonces se escribió y se debatió sobre la política en la República y en la guerra o sobre la naturaleza del franquismo. […] Un sistema universitario y unas revistas y periódicos capaces de producir en los años que van de 1976 a 1982, partiendo en muchos casos de cero y con unos archivos y unas bibliotecas que apenas comenzaban a desperezarse de un sueño de cuarenta años, la cantidad de papel dedicado al periodo comprendido bajo la denominación República-guerra civil-franquismo, debía ser buena prueba de que aquélla no era una sociedad sometida a ninguna especie de pacto de silencio, ni político, ni social, ni cultural ni de ningún otro ámbito” (Juliá, “Bajo el imperio”).

16 Juliá has gathered the columns and articles written on the topic in El País on his website: http://portal.uned.es/pls/portal/url/ITEM/356FE3D0F5737B7DC804060A32694F32

17 On other occasions Juliá has conceded that there may be something which could be called historical memory, namely the “constelación de símbolos, creencias o mitos” that bind together a community whose members have “alguna idea, algún tipo de comprensión de lo que ha ocurrido en el pasado a su grupo social y, en el tiempo de las naciones, a su comunidad nacional”. This is the kind of memory that nation-states have actively promoted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to legitimate their power or build national identities. Nevertheless, these memories are diverse and diffuse. “Imponer una memoria colectiva o histórica”, on the other hand, “es propio de regímenes autoritarios o de utopías totalitarias”. The problem with stories about the collective past that are imposed from above is that they tend to be ephemeral and opportunistic: “son la costra solidificada como resultado de una política de la historia que se desprende de la piel a la menor ocasión” (Juliá, “Bajo el imperio”).

18 To be fair, Juliá has acknowledged this lack of attention for the difusión of the knowledge produced by Spanish academic historians, grudgingly admitting that their British and American colleagues have done a much better job in that respect. Moreover, in his own work he has made explicit efforts to remedy the problem; the collective volume Víctimas de la Guerra Civil (1999) is a case in point.

19 See for example a recent polemic in the online journal Hispania Nova, directed by Julio Aróstegui (Espinosa, “Saturaciones”; Ruiz Torres, “Discursos” and “Perplejidades”; Juliá “De nuestras memorias” and “A los editores”). Another example of divisions within the profession is the fact
that Juliá has criticized the Ley de Memoria Histórica, while Julián Casanova has endorsed it (Casanova, “Después”).

20 Even for the individual historian, the temptations of “memory” are like sirens promising consolation (“Nuestras memorias” 14).

Works Cited


