Click on the title above the abstract to download the document file.
Most documents are in PDF format. If you have difficulty printing the
documents,
send an email to me (ellis.tallman@oberlin.edu).
[Links
to papers will be forthcoming in August 2009]
Joint
with Jon R. Moen. This paper examines how the New York Clearing House
and its member banks used the issuance of clearing house loan
certificates to supply the New York financial market with temporary
liquidity during the Panic of 1907. The paper employs
previously underutilized data that indicates the identity of the
requesting bank, the total amount on issuance, and the date of
cancellation of the clearing house loan certificate issue. We
find that the large, money center banks requested the majority of the
temporary liquidity issued during the panic. The finding is
not surprising given that these were the institutions that were large
enough (and at that time liquid enough) to request an amount of
temporary liquidity sufficient to support the financial markets and to
extend credit for the importation of gold from abroad.
Financial market indicators returned to normal levels only
after the gold arrived and the majority of clearing house loan
certificates were cancelled.
Forecasting
Using Relative Entropy Joint with John C.
Robertson and Charles H.
Whiteman. Published in
Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking,
(June 2005), 37, 3, 383-401.
The Bank Panic of
1907: The Role of Trust Companies Joint with Jon R.
Moen. Published in Journal
of Economic History, Vol.
52, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 611-630
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2122887
Talks
and Discussions of Papers
Talk
on the Current Crisis in Historical Perspective. Presented
at
Comment on "Trends in the
Aggregate Labor Force" by Kenneth J. Matheny presented at the
33rd Annual Economic Policy Conference of Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. October 16-17, 2009. http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/09/07/Tallman.pdf
