Helen E. Longino's
Overall
Argument
Longino begins by explaining that traditionally, pornography was seen
as immoral simply because it was a medium which depicted nudity and
sexuality. Such a condemnation of pornography was rooted in puritanical
views of sex--e.g., that all sex outside of marriage, or sex not
intended for procreation, was forbidden, that certain
kinds of sex, whether between
married people or not was an abomination, and that sex between same-sex
partners was sinful. (41) Of course, this presupposes a certain
religious view that not everyone shares today. Moreover, ideally, no
religious-based view should affect our laws. So if the intention of
proving that pornography is immoral is an initial step to making
pornography illegal, it can't be that the immorality of pornography
stems from a religious view.
Longino claims that one of the advantages of the sex revolution of the
sixties is that it paved the way for non-religious-based arguments for
why pornography is immoral. The basic idea was to connect the
immorality of pornography with the harm it may inflict on others. Since
most people, religious or not, will agree that something is immoral if
it causes injury or harm to others, then if pornography can be shown to
be injurious or harmful to others, then it can be shown to be immoral,
and, hence, there will be grounds for claiming that it should be
illegal. So, Longino attempts to prove that "pornography is immoral
because it is harmful to people." (42)
Notice that Longino's overall argument, then, is fairly simple:
Premise 1. If something is harmful or injurious to
people (or if can be shown to violate people in some way), then it is
immoral.
Premise 2. Pornography is harmful or injurious to
people (or can be shown to violate them in some way).
Conclusion: Therefore, pornography is immoral.
Premise 1
Longino doesn't argue for premise 1. Rather, she assumes that it is a
basic moral principle that all people are (or should be) commited to.
We might discuss in class whether you think this is right or not--for
example, whether something is 'harmful' or 'injurious' to a person can
often be a complicated matter, such as when a short-term harm or injury
is needed to prevent a long-term harm or injury (e.g., dental work), or
when the prevention of one person's harm or injury causes harm or
injury to another (e.g., abortion to save a mother's life).
However, it seems fair to grant Longino the truth of 1 for now, since
the majority of her article is dedicated to proving the truth of
Premise 2.
Premise 2
Defining
Pornography
Longino begins her defense of Premise 2 by defining pornography. This
is a typical approach in philosophy: before we can know whether
something has a certain property--i.e., before we can know whether
pornography is immoral or not--we better know what that something
is.
Here is her first pass at a definition of pornography: "verbal or
pictorial explicit representations of sexual behavior that...have as a
distinguishing characteristic 'the degrading and demeaning portrayal of
the role and status of the human female...as a mere sexual object to be
exploited and manipulated sexually.'" (42)
She adds: "Not all explicitly explicit material is pornography, nor is
all material which contains representations of sexual abuse and
degradation pornography." (42)
And: "Books and films may contain descriptions or representations of a
rape in order to explore the consequences of such an assault upon its
victim."
And finally: "Pornography, then, is verbal or pictorial material which
represents or describes sexual behavior which is degrading or abusing
to one or more of the participants
in
such a way as to endorse the behavior." (43, italics Longino's)
Potential
Problems
There are at least three important things to notice about the
above definition.
(I) First, if this definition is used in anyway to
argue for premise 2, then Longino skirts awfully close to
begging the question--i.e., she
appears to be assuming the very thing she is trying to prove, which is
circular reasoning. If we assume that pornography is a "
demeaning and
degrading portrayal of the role
and status of the human female...as a
mere
sexual object to be
exploited
and
manipulated sexually,"
and that it also portrays these things 'in such a way as to
endorse the behavior," (my
emphases) then it will follow by the very definition of pornography
alone that it harms or violates people. In other words, by loading the
definition with certain negative value terms (the ones' I've
italicized), she is making so that it follows directly from the very
fact that something counts as pornography that it is immoral. Yet this
is the very thing she is trying to prove, so she can't just assume it
in her definition of pornography.
To put it another way, imagine that her opponent--someone who thinks
that Premise 2 is false, that pornography is
not immoral--is having a debate
with her. Straightaway, he will reject Longino's definition of
pornography. He has no reason to accept her definition, since it is
already front-loaded with the presumption that pornography hurts
people, and he more than likely
doesn't
think that it hurts people (I am assuming that both Longino and her
imagined opponent both assent to premise 1).
(II) Second, Logion's initial statement of the
definition only qualifies as pornography those representations which
are
degrading and demaning to "the human female". This neglects sexually
explicit material that is degrading and demaning to men, children,
animals, and anything else one might imagine. So, for example, it seems
that male, gay pornography does not count as pornography according to
her intial definition.
In her defense, she does ammend this to a more sex- and gender-neutral
statement later on, when she claims that pornography is any
representation which is "degrading...to one or more of the
participants." However, this seems
to be unintended as a gender-neutral noun, since all of her examples
and arguments for showing how pornography huts people are concerned
with only women, and how only they are hurt or exploited.
(III) Finally, notice that while her definition of
pornography seems too narrow in one sense--i.e., it seems only to apply
to representations that are demeaning and degrading to women--it seems
to broad in another. For example, it may be that certain horror films
which we do not typically consider pornography, and which are
furthermore not classified in the adult section of the video store,
say, are considered pornography according to Longino's definition. This
also applies to fashion magazines and other books and movies that are
typically not considered pornography.
Now, true. Longino will be happy with the broadness of her definition,
for she wants to classify certain alblum covers and magizines such as
Vogue as pornography. (47) Yet if her definition strays too far from
our intuitive sense of what pornography is, then we will have little
reason to accept her definition in the first place. And since she
doesn't argue for why her definition is correct, but rather just states
it, it shoudl at the very least have some appeal toour common sense
notion about what pornography is.
Moving On: Lies,
Magnitude, and Violence
Leaving issues about Longino's definition aside for now, let us
move on to her claim that pornography is libelous, and causes violence
against women. Note that if she can prove that pornography is libelous
against women--i.e., that it hurts women everywhere because it spreads
lies about them--, or if it can be shown that pornography causes
violence against women in some way or other,
without resorting to Longino's definition
of pornography, then her arguments for Premise 2 will not
(obviously) be circular. So, below, we will summarize her arguments for
the claims that pornography is libelous and causes violence against
women, dismissing when required any arguments that rely on her
definition of pornography.
Longino claims in sections III that "[p]ornography, by its very nature,
requires that women be subordinate men and mere instruments for the
fulfillment of male fantasies." (45) Of course, if by "by its very
nature" Logino means 'folllows by the very definition of pornography',
then she's right. However, notice that this is circular, and thus,
fallacious.
Lies
Yet she claims that in order for pornography to accomplish making women
"subordinate men and mere instruments for the fulfillment of male
fantasies", that "pornography must be a lie." She
continues, "Pornography lies when it says that our sexual life
is or ought to be subordinate to the service of men, that our pleasure
consists in pleaseing men and not ourselves, that we are depraved, that
we are fit subjects for rape, bondage, tortue, and murder. Pronography
lies explicitly about women's sexuality, and through such lies fosters
more lies about our humanity, our dignity, and our personhood." (46)
So Longino claims that (i) pornography by its very nature makes women
subordinate to men and instruments of their pleasure, and that (ii) in
order to accomplish this, it spreads lies about what woman are like and
what they want.
Since (i) seems to rest on Longino's definition of pornography, let's
look at (ii) alone. For even if (i) is false, if (ii) can be shown to
be true, then assuming that libel and slander are immoral (and
illegal), then this will be enough to show that pornography is as well.
In order for something to be a lie, there has to be--at the very
minimum--some sort of
intent to
deceive. It would do no good to tell someone (or some one
s) something false if they
already knew it was false. So, for example, telling fictional
stories or tall tales are not considered lies, since it's assumed that
both the teller and the hearer understand that what's being said is
false. A lie involves telling someone something you believe to be
false, but which you try to convince your listener is true. So, for
example, a politician telling his public he did not embezzle money from
public funds when in fact he did, and furthermore
knows he did, is clearly a lie.
So, is pornography more like the telling of a tall tale--a piece of
fiction--or more like that of a politician trying to deceive his public?
No doubt there could be quite a debate about this. But the important
point relevant to Longino's article is that she does not give an
argument either way. Rather, she merely asserts that pornography lies,
with the added claim that, because of the anonymous nature of the women
portrayed in the film, it is a general lie about all women everywhere.
(46)
Moreover, notice that if pornography is considered a lie, then all
trouble could presumably be solved by having a disclaimer at the
beginning of all
pornographic material. Something like: "The following material you are
about to see does not represent any real person or persons and does not
intend to be an accurate representation of any realistic
characteristics of any human beings. This is a complete work of
fiction; it is fantasy. The makers of this film are entirely exempt
from the responsibility of any viewer who takes away from this film any
moral message or any true statement about real life. No person acts
like this or should act like this and if you, viewer, think that they
do, you are one sick puppy." Etc...
Magnitude
She claims that "[e]ach work of pornography is on its own libelous and
defamatory, yet gains power through being reinforced by every other
pornographic work." She continues: "The sheer number of pornographic
productions expands the moral issue to include not only assessing the
morality or immorality of individual works, but also the meaning and
force of the mass production of pornography." (46)
Notice that this is a different claim than that pornography is a lie.
It is a claims about the magnitude of the moral offense, since
production and distribution of pornographic material is so pervasive.
And, admittedly, it might be true that if the production of an
individual pornographic piece is immoral, then mass production of it
would be something even more egregious. (Consider the parallel
argument: if killing one person is bad, killing a million is even
worse.)
Yet notice that Longino's opponent--again, someone who grants the truth
of Premise 1 but denies Premise 2--could
agree with Longino's point here.
That is, it is easy enough for Longino;s opponent to agree that
if pornography is wrong in one
case, then it is even worse when there's mass production of it. He
could agree, in other words, that the magnitude of an offense can
intensify the immorality of it. But all of this is conditional upon
morality being immoral in the first place, which is the very thing that
is at issue. So Longino's claim about the magnitude of the immorality
of the mass production of pornography, while perhaps true, is
contingent upon the very conclusion that Longino is arguing
for, and which she has yet to
prove.
Violence
Next, Longino claims that there is an empirical link between
pornography and violent, sexual acts such as rape and domestic abuse.
If there is such a link, then this will be enough to establish the
truth of Premise 2.
But there are two points to note here. First, as even Longino herself
admits, the empirical evidence supporting this claim is inconclusive at
best. Second, as soon as a philosophical problem turns empirical, it no
longer becomes a philosophical problem. This doesn't make the argument
any worse, of course, but it does make the issue a purely empirical
matter that can be solved simply by going out and getting statistics of
crime rates and how they are related to availability of pornography. If
the empirical data shows there is a correlation, then Premise 2 is
true, the case is closed, and all the philosophers can go home. If not,
then it is still and open debate whether 2 is true or not, and
philosophers may still have some work to do.
Moving On:
Pornography and the Law (Free Speech)
Typically, a defense of the rejection of premise 2--i.e. a
defense of the claim that pornography does
not hurt people, and that,
moreover,
banning pornography
will hurt people--is an appeal to the First Amendment.
The argument we discussed in class went like this:
Premise 1: Pornography is a form of speech.
Premise 2: Freedom of speech is protected by the
First Amendment.
Conclusion: Pornography is proteced by tthe First
Amendment.
Longino claims that while it is true that freedom of speech is
protected by the First Amendment, it is not true that ALL speech is so
proctected. For example, "the incitement to violence in volatile
circumstances, solicitation of crimes, perjury, misrepresentation,
slander, libel, and false advertising" are all forms of speech that are
not protected by the First Amendment. So there are limits on the kinds
of speech that are allowed, legally. So, the question now is: does
pornography count among those kinds of speech that are exempt from
protection from the First Amendment, or not? In other words, is
pornography,
as a form of speech,
more like the mere voicing of an opinion, or is it more like slander,
libel, or false advertising?
Longino clearly thinks that pornography is like the latter, making it
one of those forms of speech that are not protected by the First
Amendment. But her argument for this claim is rather short, and
arguably unconvincing to someone who doesn't already agree with her.
(We will discuss this point further in class.)
Page Last Updated: Nov. 14, 2006