Exam I Review Sheet
for
Metaphysics
Philosophy 208
Format: The exam
will consist of two parts: short answer
and long answer. There will be 6-8 short answer questions of which you
pick
4-5. Answers should be anywhere from one to five sentences. There will
be
3 long answer questions, of which you pick 2. Answers should be about 2
blue-book
pages, front and back. The exam is scheduled for Wednesday, October 7 at
our regular
class time, our regular class place. There will be a brief
review in class on Monday, October 5 and on the discussion forum, if
you
choose to use it.
Some Terms
Deductive Arguments
Valid/Invalid
Sound
Inductive
Arguments
Strong/Weak
Cogent
Modus Ponens
Possible
Worlds
A Priori
A Posteriori
Leibniz's Law
Transitivity of Identity
One Bit No Diff Principle
Identity in a loose and popular sense vs. Identity in a strict and
philosophical sense
Quinean Criterion of Ontological Commitment
Paraphrasing
Fictionalism
Perdurantism
Endurantism
Eternalism
Presentism
The 'anticipation' criterion for personal identity (in Chisholm and
Perry)
Weirob's Challenge
The Soul View
Dualism
Materialism
Intensional Fallacy
Person Stages/Temporal Parts
Memory View of Personal
Identity
Body View of Personal Identity (Weirob's position)
Arguments
and
Objections
Ship of Theseus
Argument
Options in Response to the Ship of Theseus Argument
Chisholm's Response to the Ship of Theseus Argument
Ambiguity and Invalidity (how ambiguous terms can invalidate an
argument)
The Puzzle of Change
Options in Response to the Puzzle of Change
Perdurantist's Response to the Puzzle of Change
Endurantist's Response to the Puzzle of Change
Why Hinchliff thinks that neither the Perdurantist and Endurantist
solve the Puzzle
Hinchliff's Response to the Puzzle of Change
Special Relativity as an Objection to Presentism
Arguments against Dualism: elusiveness of spirit, correlation of minds
and bodies, location of spirits, continuity of nature (evolution and
individual growth)
Arguments for Dualism: from semantic properties, aesthetic properties,
modal properties, from location, ineffability of qualia, possibility of
ghosts and zombies, argument from free will, Descartes' knowledge
argument
Body Translplant Case (for Memory
View of Personal Identity)
Fission (or Duplication) Case (against
Brain Identity and Memroy View)
Intransitivity of Memory Objection to Memory View
Hume on Personal Identity (what is his view and why?)
Page Last Updated: Oct. 5, 2009