Things to Know for the Final Exam



Format:
The exam will consist of two parts: short answer and long answer. There will be 20 short answer questions of which you pick 15. Answers should be anywhere from one to five sentences. There will be 6-8 long answer questions, of which you pick 3-4. Answers should be about 2-4 blue book pages. The exam is scheduled for Tuesday APRIL 20 at 4:00pm, our regular class place. You may bring in 1 page of notes, back and front.

Some Terms and Principles

Deductive Arguments
Valid/Invalid
Soundness
Inductive Arguments
Strong/Weak
Cogent
A Priori
A Posteriori
Contingent
Necessary
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
Possible Worlds
Quantitative vs. Qualitative Identity
Puzzles of Objects: 7 Commonsense Truisms (and why we think they are true)
Leibniz's Law
Indiscernibility of Identicals
Identity of Indiscernibles
Wiggins's S and S*
Mereology
Mereological Sums
Mereological Simples
Gunk
Sortals (and "qua" talk)
Persistence Conditions (Modal Properties)
Law of Substitutivity of CoReferential Terms
A Posteriori Necessity
Rigid Designators
Modal Realism
The Soul View (Perry's Dialogues)
Argument by Analogy
Mind-Body Dualism
Material Monism
Identity Theory
Intensional Fallacy
5 Principles (that generate the Mind-Body Problem)
Epicurean View
Epicurean Position
Makropolus Position
Deprivational Account
The Pleasure Machine


Puzzles, Arguments, and Objections

The Debtor's Paradox
The Ship of Theseus
Tib and Tibbles
Goliath and Lumpl
Max Black's Balls: A Challenge for the Identity of Indiscernibles
Responses to Max Black's Example
Tree and Cellulose Example
Paradox of the Heap
Wiggins's S*, and how it relates to the puzzles
Coincident Entities (as a solution to the puzzles)
Contingent Identity
Gibbard's Theory of Names, and his solution to the puzzles
Eliminitivism about objects (Unger and van Inwagen)
Unger's Arguments for Why He Does Not Exist
Van Inwagen's Arguments for why Tables and Chairs Do Not Exist
Heller's Solution to the Puzzles (i.e., four-dimensionalism)
Miller's Arguments for the Soul View
Weirob's Objections to Miller's Arguments

Arguments for Dualism: Descartes' epistemic argument, the afterimages problem, the Leggo example, ineffability of qualia, intentionality worries, failures of "solutions" to Puzzles of objects, recognition of other immaterial stuff, apparent non-location of mental phenomena, Kafka-esque thought experiments, arguments from free will, ghosts and zombies.

Arguments for Material Monism (Identity Theory): inadequacy of Dualism, success of neuroscience, Occam's Razor considerations, evolution of a single human being, evolution of all conscious (human) beings, Anti-spooky (i.e, Scooby Doo) Principle considerations.

Objections to Dualism: Problem of Interaction, Occam's Razor considerations, Anti-Spooky (i.e., Scooby Doo) Principle considerations, success of neuroscience.

Objections to Material Monism (Identity Theory): Locational properties worry, Semantic properties worry, Aesthetic properties worry, Modal properties worry, ineffability of qualia, Jackson's Mary Argument, Multiple-realizability argument.

2 Arguments for the Epicurean Position (via Bernard Williams)
1 More Argument for the Epicurean view (via Rosenbaum)
3 Objections to the Deprivational Account (Nagel talks about these, as well as Rosenbaum, Williams, and Brueckner and Fischer)
The Parfit Example
Betrayal Case (Buekner and Fischer)
Grandma Case (Bruekner and Fischer)
Pleasure Case (Bruekner and Fischer)
Symmetric Timeline Case (Bruekner and Fischer, p. 228, last example)


Page Last Updated: April 21, 2008
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