Q and A's
Below are some sample, anonymous
questions that I've received from some of you throughout the semester,
and my answers. They cover both specific and general content, and
perhaps some administrative details of
the course. Please feel free to email me with any questions you have
and I will post the topics publicly here. I will continue to add to
this list as the semester continues. Questions are organized by topic,
and then chronologically. Please let me know if you would
like a particular question posted here, or if you would prefer that I
not post a particular question that you send me via email. Questions
are numbered and in bold; answers are in regular font.
Descartes
1. If the mind is
indivisible like we discussed in class, then how can one forget. The
example another student brought up in class was of the diary one makes
of younger years and then when they get older, they do not have any
recollection of those thought that they had when they were a young
child. The only way that person knows of those thoughts is through
reading them out of the diary the person kept. Or is my question not
even relevant because we/Decartes hasn't even established that there is
such thing as a memory?
Yes, you're right, Descartes hasn't yet
established that we have a memory, or that there are veridical things
in the world that correspond to the things that we seem to
remember. The only thing we have right now are (i) that you are a
thinking thing: a thing that thinks, understands, imagines, seems to
remember, etc., and (ii) that this thinking thing, or mind, is distinct
from material things (if there are any).
2. I
understand the concept that when thinking it means you exist. But what
if you're not thinking..even for a few moments, does that mean you
don't 'currently' exist? I don't know if this question makes sense or
is even important. But I am not sure if he points out anything that has
to do with someone existing or
not existing within a certain time period. Sorry..wasn't sure if it
made any sense,
but after I submitted it I thought maybe Descartes meant that because
one has the ability to think, he or she exists exists regardless of
anything else? Well, I'm not sure I understand this last part. If you
exist, you are thinking and so you always (as long as you are existing)
have the ability to think (trivially--because you are). Does that make
sense?
Yes, I think Descartes thought that if
you are not thinking, you don't exist. Remember the two conditionals we
put up on the board?:
(i) If I think, I exist.
(ii) If I exist, I think.
Descartes seems to endorse both (i) and
(ii), which gives him the bi-conditional (iii):
(iii) I think if and only if I exist.
Daniel (in class and on the discussion
board) argued that he didn't think that (ii) was true. And it sounds
like you don't either. Even if it is just for a few moments, as you
say, Descartes thinks that can't happen. But just why he thinks
this is importantly tied up with what he thinks he is.
Remember, that through his arguments for Dualism, he thinks he is
essentially a thinking thing. This thinking thing may be embodied, and
it may not. But the body is in some ways irrelevant. If you are a
essentially a thinking thing, then you can't *not* think, or
you don't exist. Of course, what counts as thinking may be pretty
minimal, but he certainly doesn't claim that we have 'gaps' of
cognitive activity or anything like that (or that was stop thinking
when we're sleeping, say).
3.
Descartes seems to
say that whatever he perceives distinctly and clearly is true, but his
only argument seems to be that the fact that he is a thinking thing is
clear and distinct and true, therefore that is one criterion for
knowledge. this seems circular? how does the argument go?i
think therefore i am the fact that i think is clear and distinct to my
perception the fact that i think therefore i am is true therefore,
whatever i think clearly and distinctly is true...i don't know what it
is, or how it goes wrong or if it goes right.
It does seem circular, but try to think
of it this way: He thinks that when he gets to the cogito, he has found
some bit of knowledge that he can know infallibly: namely, that he
exists. That he exists is something that is necessarily true every time
he thinks it, doubts it, says it, etc. This certainty carries with it a
property "clear and distinctness." There is a way that he knows
that he exists, and that way is the clear and distinct perception. So
he thinks that there may be other things that he can clearly and
distinctly know as well. That is, there may be other things that he can
know with as much certainty as the cogito. So, for the rest of the
meditations, he is on the hunt for anything else he might clearly and
distinctly perceive to be true (e.g., that a supremely perfect being
exists, etc.).
4. I've looked it up
and i can't tell what a sophism is.
He is using the term 'sophism' to mean
a fallacious argument that is rhetorically effective but is making some
kind of mistake somewhere.
5.
When Descartes says "objective reality" does he mean representational
reality? and if so, how does God, in many ways the opposite of
us, have more representational reality than a table?
One way to think about this is in terms
of perfections. Tables and chairs and you and me, we are all objects
that are imperfect. God, however is perfect. Now we may all have a
rough idea of God and his perfections, but he doesn't think that an
idea of something, x, can be caused by something with less greatness or
perfection than x. So an idea of a perfect being could in no way be
caused by something less perfect than the perfection of the idea. So
imperfect things like tables and chairs and you and me couldn't
possible cause an idea like God. Only a being as perfect of the idea of
God could cause us to have the idea of God. SO, it must be that God
exists.
If you think of perfection or greatness
as degrees of reality, and then imagine that nothing less great (or
with less objective reality) can be a cause of something more great (or
with more objective reality), then you get that God, who has more
objective reality than us (or tables) is the only thing that could be
the cause of our idea of a perfect and supreme being.
There's a reason I prefer Descartes'
argument for God in the Fifth Meditation than the Third; the one in the
Third is a bit of a mess. But we will be discussing in more detail in
class, time permitting.
6. In the
third meditation Descartes says, "Again, I perceive that I now
exist, and remember that I have existed for some time...". Does
he ever make an argument for memory?
No. But he does think that 'I exist' is
true every time he says it or thinks it. And since he has been
attending to it and thinking about it for some time, he gets that he
exists for some time.
It is true that he has not yet thwarted the evil genius hypothesis, and
so he has not quite got back his memory, or allowed to trust it. He has
to get God (a supremely perfect and morally good being) into the
picture before he can discount the evil demon hypothesis.
7. How/when is he
suddenly a substance? Or is a substance to him simply a
collection
of traits that can be distinguished from other collections of traits?
Right. Remember in class that I said 'substance' is nothing more than
'thing'. So proving that he is an aspatial, non-extending, thinking *thing*
is all that he means when he says he is a thinking substance.
8. Why can't
something equally as perfect as God be imagined? i think i can
imagine two gods equally perfect...that might not change his point, but
nonetheless. does duplicity take away from perfections? is
that what is implied?
Yes. The idea is that if there were two
perfect Gods, then they couldn't both be all-powerful. Because if God 1
wants to do something, and God 2 doesn't want God 1 to do it, then we
run into a paradox. Which one wins out? If God 1 does, then God 2 isn't
all-powerful. If God 2 does, then God 1 isn't all-powerful. If neither
does, then neither is all-powerful. And if both do, then we run into a
contradiction. So, by reductio, we cannot have two all-powerful beings.
And all-powerfullness is one of the perfections that a perfect being
has. Descartes doesn't give this argument,
but it is a quick way to understand why there cannot be two perfect
beings.
Another line of reasoning to consider:
in class we talked about Leibniz's Law (and it is discussed briefly on
this handout
here). One of
the conditionals that makes up Leibniz's Law is:
(i)
If for any property x has, y
has, and
for any property y has, x has, then x is
identical
to y.
This is called the Identity of
Indiscernibles. If x and y have every property in common, then x = y.
But let us assume what you claim is possible: a world where there are two perfect beings, God 1 and God
2. Yet if God 1 and God 2 have every
property in common, then there will be no reason to suppose that
there are two gods instead
of one. Indeed, by the
Identity of Indiscernibles, we have to conclude that God 1 = God 2,
contrary to our original assumption. So, by reductio, it is impossible
that there could be two perfect
beings; if there exists a perfect being, there can only be one.
9. What are your
feelings for his arguments that God created him to be imperfect.
is it mostly that God is rigth in giving him total will but not total
judgment? and how does that work? why would a perfect
god give him will beyond intellect? he just says, "...it is in
the nature of a created intellect to be finite". he actually says
that he cannot deny the idea that imperfections in the human world
really make up a perfect overall world.
These are good questions, related to something called "The Problem of
Evil". I have a handout on it
here. But as far
as I can tell, Descartes doesn't really take the issue up in the
Meditations. But he doesn't need to. It's not necessary that he
understand
why God made him perfect, just as long as he can
know that he isn't. If he establishes that he himself isn't perfect
(for whatever reason) yet he still has the idea of perfection, then
this idea must have come from something outside of him. And then we are
off and running with the argument I've summarized in answer to question
5 (above).
10. I can imagine
mind not equally body, but mind being dependent upon body and therefore
the mind could exist and not be thinking. (again, just using my
imagination).
You can imagine your thinking thing not
thinking? How are you imagining that? Descartes thinks (and he seems
right here) that you can't imagine that you are thinking about you not
thinking. You can imagine a body
not thinking, but how is this body you?
11. Is Descartes
suggesting that knowledge of God is as innate as knowledge of self?
Yes. In the Fifth Meditations, he
claims that his idea of God is as clearly and distinctly perceived as
is the knowledge that he exists. It is immediate, and (so) he cannot be
wrong about it.
12. Descartes states that the
cause must have as more or equal the amount of effect, but i can
imagine a cigarette butt falling from the fingers of a man falling
asleep and causing the whole house to burn down...in which case the
cause is NOT greater than the effect...BUT, it holds the Potential for
the effect.
But the heat of the fire (effect) is
not greater than the heat of the fire in the cigarette butt (cause). It
is supposed to be a principle akin to physicists principle of the
conservation of energy. You cannot get something more out of something
less. This is related to my answer to question 5 (above).
13. To me, much of
Descartes' ideas depend on the mind NOT being indivisible. but
again, i can imagine a mind broken into parts. does he ever give
an argument for the mind being a whole entity incapable of being broken
into parts?
How can you imagine your mind 'broken'
into parts? If your mind is aspatial and non-extended, doesn't it just
follow that it doesn't have parts (there is no right half or left half,
e.g.)?
14.
Here is one argument:
i can know superman from that caped thing outside.
i cannot know clark kent from that caped thing
outside.
therefore, superman does not equal clark kent.
If this argument is false, isn't
descartes' argument false about mind not equalling
body?:
i cannot doubt my mind exists.
i can doubt my body exists.
therefore, my mind does not equal my body.
Isn't this also false? and is it
descartes' argument for duality or his successors?
OK. Remember that arguments aren't
false, only premises or propositions are. Arguments (deductive
arguments) can, however be valid or invalid (or sound or unsound). One
way to determine whether an argument is invalid is to see if we can go
from true premises to a false conclusion. If we can, the argument is
valid; if we can't, it's valid. The first argument involving superman
presumably has true premises, but it leads to an obviously false
conclusion. So this tells us that this argument form is invalid. So
when we substitute "mind" for "superman" etc., and produce the second
argument, we know that this argument is invalid as well.
Now, just because a certain argument is
invalid, this doesn't mean that the conclusion is false. Indeed, we can
have invalid arguments that have true conclusions. Consider:
(1) If humans are mortal, then I'm a monkey's uncle.
(2) I'm a monkey's uncle.
(3) Therefore, humans are mortal .
False premises, invalid argument form,
but the conclusion is true.
So that's why we kept revising
Descartes' argument for the conclusion that his mind is not identical
to his body. Even though the first formulations for this conclusion
were shown to be invalid, we tried to formulate an argument that wasn't
(argument (E), for example, on the handout I passed around Monday
9/8/08).
Page Last Updated: Sept.
10, 2008