Exam I Review Sheet
for
Metaphysics
Philosophy 208

Format: The exam will consist of two parts: short answer and long answer. There will be 6-8 short answer questions of which you pick 4-5. Answers should be anywhere from one to five sentences. There will be 3 long answer questions, of which you pick 2. Answers should be about 2 blue-book pages, front and back. The exam is scheduled for Wednesday, October 7 at our regular class time, our regular class place. There will be a brief review in class on Monday, October 5 and on the discussion forum, if you choose to use it.

Some Terms

Deductive Arguments
Valid/Invalid
Sound
Inductive Arguments
Strong/Weak
Cogent
Modus Ponens
Possible Worlds
A Priori
A Posteriori
Leibniz's Law
Transitivity of Identity
One Bit No Diff Principle
Identity in a loose and popular sense vs. Identity in a strict and philosophical sense

Quinean Criterion of Ontological Commitment
Paraphrasing
Fictionalism
Perdurantism
Endurantism
Eternalism
Presentism
The 'anticipation' criterion for personal identity (in Chisholm and Perry)
Weirob's Challenge
The Soul View
Dualism
Materialism
Intensional Fallacy
Person Stages/Temporal Parts
Memory View of Personal Identity
Body View of Personal Identity (Weirob's position)

Arguments and Objections

Ship of Theseus Argument
Options in Response to the Ship of Theseus Argument
Chisholm's Response to the Ship of Theseus Argument
Ambiguity and Invalidity (how ambiguous terms can invalidate an argument)
The Puzzle of Change
Options in Response to the Puzzle of Change
Perdurantist's Response to the Puzzle of Change
Endurantist's Response to the Puzzle of Change
Why Hinchliff thinks that neither the Perdurantist and Endurantist solve the Puzzle
Hinchliff's Response to the Puzzle of Change
Special Relativity as an Objection to Presentism
Arguments against Dualism: elusiveness of spirit, correlation of minds and bodies, location of spirits, continuity of nature (evolution and individual growth)
Arguments for Dualism: from semantic properties, aesthetic properties, modal properties, from location, ineffability of qualia, possibility of ghosts and zombies, argument from free will, Descartes' knowledge argument
Body Translplant Case (for Memory View of Personal Identity)
Fission (or Duplication) Case (against Brain Identity and Memroy View)
Intransitivity of Memory Objection to Memory View
Hume on Personal Identity (what is his view and why?)


Page Last Updated: Oct. 5, 2009
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