Editorial

Not when, but how

Judging by President Bush’s press conference on Thursday, it seems that war on Iraq is a foregone conclusion. This means that Oberlin students, both those who are for and those who are against this war, should begin to think ahead. What potential pitfalls lie in the future, for Americans and for the world? Or, to expand on a question asked of Bush on Thursday: what’s the worst case scenario?
To begin with, consider Bush’s overt motive for war — disarming Saddam Hussein. Even many of those who oppose this war admit that Iraq likely retains a stockpile of chemical and biological weapons. Does it stand to reason, then, that if Saddam is faced with certain destruction, he will lose his inhibitions about using them? That is, won’t going to war to get rid of these weapons have the ironic effect of creating a cause for those same weapons to be used? Remember that Saddam has had months to try to infiltrate America — which he succeeded in doing during the first Gulf War, although last time his agents botched the job. While removing Saddam from power may increase homeland security in the long run, the near future seems much less certain.
And even if Saddam does not employ his weapons of mass destruction, will the occupying American forces be able to contain their spread from Iraq? Secretary of State Colin Powell has made much of Iraq’s mobile biological weapons labs. But if we can’t find them now, the chances of our finding them in the fog of war also seem dim. Where these mobile labs end up could be a matter of life or death for thousands, both in the region and around the world.
Second is a question of metaphors. Certain members of the Bush administration have done their best to convince the world that Saddam in 2003 is analogous to Hitler in 1938 — that appeasing Saddam now will only create a graver threat in the future, and that he must be dealt with early, before he blossoms into a greater danger. But should we really be thinking August, 1914?
In World War I, the great powers were convinced that a short, decisive war would be the best way to secure their own interests in the future. And, of course, they went on to unleash the most destructive conflict ever seen until World War II.
The Middle East today seems to be a tenuous balance of power that could easily be upset. Kani Xulam, director of the American Kurdish Information Network, has predicted that the Turkish government will use the upcoming conflict as an excuse to occupy northern Iraq — nominally, to protect the rights of ethnic Turkmen now living there. The Kurds — who, just across the border, waged a partisan war against Turkey for years — would doubtless resist. Iran, too, has moved troops into northern Iraq. Mr. Xulam predicted they would side with the Kurds against the Turks in order to keep Turkey from controlling northern Iraq.
How, then, should America react to a bloody war between its nominal allies, the Kurds and the Turks — with Iran thrown haphazardly into the mix?
Third, we must consider the cost of the war and the following occupation, and the United States’ commitment over the long term. American officials have placed the top-end price tag for a war in Iraq at $200 billion. But few major wars in history have cost anything less than multiple times what the planners estimated before the knives came out. A recent study by a leading think-tank in the U.K. predicted that rebuilding Iraq will take 10 years, more or less. Are Americans prepared to foot the bill, and to maintain the commitment that rebuilding Iraq will take? Or will the U.S. shirk its responsibilities as soon as its economy takes a turn for the worse?
Recognizing the overbearing probability of war is not to suggest that protest no longer serves a purpose, or that Oberlin students concerned over the state of world affairs should refrain from active dissent. Instead, the issues should be refocused. American leaders must remember that their citizens are watching. After all, the question today is not when, but how.

Editorials are the responsibility of the Review editorial board—the Editors in Chief, Managing Editor and Commentary Editor—and do not necessarily reflect the view of the staff of the Review.